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Abstract
In this paper I argue against the theory – popular among theorists of narrative artworks –
that we must posit a fictional narrative agent in every narrative artwork in order to
explain our imaginative engagement with such works. I accept that every narrative must
have a narrator, but I argue that in some central literary cases the narrator is not a
fictional agent, but rather the actual author of the work. My criticisms focus on the
strongest argument for the ubiquity of fictional narrators, Jerrold Levinson’s ontologicalgap argument. Finally, I outline an alternative “minimal theory” of narrators, and some
consequences thereof.

Against the Ubiquity of Fictional Narrators
A large group of artworks can be usefully classified as narratives. These are works that
tell stories. It is a far from easy task to set down criteria for membership in this genus,
and I shall not be attempting that here.1 Rather, taking the genus of narrative artworks for
granted, I will investigate one species: narrative literature. A number of recent theorists –
most notably Seymour Chatman, Jerrold Levinson, and George Wilson – have argued
that there is necessarily a fictional narrator in every narrative, a conclusion I call the
“ubiquity thesis.” I shall argue that the ubiquity thesis is mistaken, since certain
paradigmatic novels and stories have no narrator in the sense these theorists employ. 2
Though I limit my discussion here to literary narratives, what I propose could be adapted
for other species of narrative, a point I return to at the end of the paper.
I. THE NATURE OF THE FICTIONAL NARRATOR

Before we investigate whether or not novels invariably have narrators, we should
establish the nature of the snark we are hunting. I shall be disputing the ubiquity of a
narrator understood as possessing just two essential features. The first is agency.
Chatman, Levinson, and Wilson all point out that narration is an activity, something that
gets done, and as such implies an agent. But their strongest motivation behind specifying
“agency” as a feature of narrators is that it is a broader term than “humanity.” It is easy to
point out that if novels have narrators, they often know more than, and have powers
greater than, any human could. Thus, a ubiquity theorist must insist from the start that
“human personality is not a sine qua non for narratorhood.”3
The second distinguishing feature these narrators have is fictionality. That is,
these theorists claim that each novel’s narrator is on the same ontological level as its
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characters and events. Again, they are at pains to point out that the claim is not that the
narrator is a character in the traditional sense (though this may be the case – for example,
in most novels narrated in the first person), merely that it is not to be posited at the level
of actuality, but rather at the fictional level. 4
Let me also make clear that I do not deny the existence of fictional narrators.
They most obviously exist in first-person narrated novels. Indeed, it may be that most
novels have fictional narrators. But I will argue that a certain central kind of novel has no
fictional narrator, and that the ubiquity thesis is thus false. My strategy will be to
investigate the main arguments for the ubiquity of fictional narrators in novels. I make
use of several observations that George Wilson makes in “Le Grand Imagier Steps Out”5;
oddly enough, Wilson is there a ubiquity theorist, yet I believe his criticisms point
towards a more restricted role for fictional narrators, one which he is simply unwilling
ultimately to accept.
II. THE ANALYTIC ARGUMENT

We have already touched on the first argument for the ubiquity of fictional narrators –
what I call the “Analytic Argument.” The authority to look to here is Chatman. He argues
that every narrative is by definition narrated – that is, narratively presented –
and that narration, narrative presentation, entails an agent even when the
agent bears no signs of human personality. Agency is marked etymologically
by the -er/-or suffix attached to the verbs “present” or “narrate.” The suffix
means either “agent” or “instrument,” and neither need be human....The
notion of “non-narrated” narrative arises as a misguided effort to restrict
“agency” to human beings, but the restriction will not hold. 6
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Wilson and Levinson both cite parts of this passage, 7 and Levinson offers his own
formulation: “[I]f narration means anything, it is the conveying or imparting of a story by
means [i.e. media] that are distinct both from the story being conveyed and from that
which is doing the conveying [i.e. the narrative agent]...” 8
I believe this argument is sound. The only way I can imagine attacking it would
be to claim that narration is something like biological growth – an event or process, but
not an action, therefore implying no agent. I find this suggestion untenable. Stories do not
simply appear out of thin air; they do not occur naturally, independently of human
agency, as the growth of trees does. 9 Paisley Livingston has argued that it may be
indeterminate whether or not any given narrative has a narrator. 10 But I cannot
countenance this either. It is a simple conceptual point that stories must be told in some
way by some thing.
However, we should note that the conclusion of the Analytic Argument is fairly
weak. All it says is that there is an agent who is responsible for the narrative. This is
compatible with the view that there are no fictional narrators. For authors would seem to
be prima facie candidates for the agents responsible for their narratives. They do things
that result in the stories we read. So the ubiquity theorist needs more to establish even the
existence of fictional narrators, let alone their ubiquity.
III. THE ONTOLOGICAL- GAP ARGUMENT

Jerrold Levinson has provided the strongest argument that in order to make sense of our
engagement with fictions, in addition to the author we need to posit a narrator at the
fictional level. Though Levinson focuses on narrative film, it is clear that he would
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extend his argument to narrative literature. The argument has two main stages, and is
founded on questions about how it is we come to know what is fictional in a work.
The first is a positive stage – it seeks to establish something. Levinson argues that
we can reasonably expect an answer to how it is we are being given information about the
world of the fiction we are reading or viewing. And the obvious answer is that someone
is presenting it to us:
Reason – albeit reason operating in service of the imaginative understanding
of fiction – demands an answer to how it is that a world is being made visible
to us, and that demand, it appears, is only satisfied by the assumption of an
agency responsible for that.11
The notion of a presenter, whose main charge is the providing of perceptual
access on the fictional world, is simply the best default assumption available
for how we make sense of narrative fiction film. 12
At first this may not seem to establish anything more than the Analytic Argument did.
But, as these quotations make clear, the Ontological-Gap Argument goes beyond the
Analytic Argument by restricting the class of narratives being discussed to fictional
narratives. Hence, the real bite of this argument comes at the second stage.
The second stage is negative – it seeks to deny that an agent who gives us
epistemic access to a fictional world can coherently be considered to occupy a different
ontological level from that world. The basic idea is that if the narrative agent were
outside the fictional world – at our ontological level, say – it could not coherently present
us with the story events and characters as if they were real, that is, on its own ontological
level. Hence the narrator must be fictional, and thus cannot be the author (or filmmaker).
4

A narrator and the events narrated by the narrator must be on the same
fictional plane, otherwise cognitive relations posited between narrator and
events would not make sense....The implied filmmaker can’t be in the
position of directly affording us – as with a silent gesture of “behold!” – the
vision and audition of something that is only fictional with respect to himself,
namely, the characters and their circumstances; that remains the prerogative
of the film’s narrator or presenter, who is, in a fundamental sense...“one of
them.” 13
There are problems with both stages of this argument, and I will address them in turn.
IV. THE POSITIVE STAGE

George Wilson makes some telling observations about the coherence of the foundations
of fictions which should give us pause when considering Levinson’s claim that we can
reasonably expect answers to questions about our epistemic access to fictional worlds.
Wilson points out that there may be paradoxes or incoherencies at the very base of
fictional works. For instance, a novel may represent itself as a copy of a diary that must
have been destroyed in the story-culminating fire. 14 More commonly, it is indeterminate
whether the narrator is supposed to be thinking the words we are reading, speaking them
aloud, or has written them down, and in any case, how we are supposed to have gotten
hold of a transcription or copy. 15 The nicest example is provided by David Hills: “The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn...represents itself as a carefully crafted 300 page memoir
by its title character, a barely literate young man getting ready to set out for the territories
because the prospect of any work that requires him to sit still terrifies him.” 16 In sum:
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[T]he reader imagines reading a transcription of the narrator’s own utterances
or inscriptions, but her imagination does not specify anything about what
makes it possible for her to do this. Fictionally, it is indeterminate how the
reader can be acquainted, as she is, with the product of the narrator’s
storytelling performance. 17
Now, the point of marshalling these observations here is to repel Levinson’s first
sally. If reason does not demand an answer to how we come to see or know about the
fictional world, then the one that Levinson provides – namely, that there is a fictional
narrator – is simply otiose. Of course, that will not be a very powerful rejoinder if the
second stage of Levinson’s argument leads to a successful theory. If a theory explains
something, we do not need any extra motivation to adopt it. I will get to the adequacy of
the second stage soon, but there is yet another problem Wilson’s points raise for the first
stage.
Suppose reason did demand an answer to the question of how we have access to
the fictional world. And suppose we answered: “By means of a fictional narrative agent.”
What leads Levinson to believe that reason will be satisfied with that? Surely there are
further questions to be asked, such as what sort of agent this is, how it knows so much
about the world, and how it imparts this information to us? It seems odd to suppose that
reason could take this first step on to the slippery slope of fiction-foundational questions
by asking how we come to know about the fictional world, and then get a satisfactory
grip with such a tenuous answer – that there is some fictional narrative agent – thus
managing to resist sliding any further. This problem is even more glaring in Chatman’s
exposition. Immediately after an extended argument that reason demands an explanation
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of how we are presented with this story, and that a fictional narrator is the only
possibility, he goes on to say that “[h]ow the narrator came to ‘know’ the provided
information seems a nonquestion.” 18 This is a curiously sudden loss of interest.
However, even if we grant Levinson the first stage of his argument, the second
stage is untenable. I turn again to Wilson for my cue. He makes a simple but crucial
distinction between actual telling and fictional telling. The End of the Road (1958) is
John Barth’s second novel. It is a first-person narrative by the main character, Jacob
Horner. We can thus distinguish between the actual telling of the fictional story, which
John Barth engages in, and the fictional telling of the story engaged in by Horner.
Wilson’s observation is that each of these tellings, by the Analytic Argument, entails a
teller. But he points out that only the fictional telling implies a fictional teller (just as a
fictional shooting, say, implies only a fictional gunman). The actual telling of the story
implies only an actual teller.
Now, it so happens that Horner is, in Gregory Currie’s terminology, 19 a
controlling narrator: it is fictional that he produces a text identical to the one we have
before us. It also happens that The End of the Road is the most coherently founded fiction
I know.20 The text implies that Horner has produced it as Scriptotherapy – a part of his
ongoing treatment at the Remobilization Farm. Unlike so many well-founded fictions,
this explains not only the existence of this text in the fictional world, but also its literary
qualities. 21 But neither of these points is essential. David Copperfield (1849-50, Wilson’s
example) is a first person narrative by the eponymous main character, but it seems
unlikely that Copperfield is a controlling narrator, and hence the fiction is ill-founded (or
at least indeterminately founded). But clearly there are still two tellings here: Dickens’s
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actual telling of the fictional story and Copperfield’s fictional telling of his life-story.
There are plenty of problematic cases also. It is not clear that we can take the belatedly
intrusive first-person narrator in John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman to be the
actual John Fowles (as the narrator tries to imply, at least on one level), or whether he is
rather another fictional entity.
However, I would argue that there are also clear cases where there is no fictional
telling. Graham Greene often writes in a plain third-person omniscient narrative style. In
The Heart of the Matter (1948) he tells the pathetically tragic tale of Scobie, and I see no
reason to suppose that anyone else does. Of course, there are various embedded narrators
in the novel – most of the characters tell stories about their lives, as in most novels – but
there seems to be no reason to posit any overarching narrator other than Greene. 22 The
book as a whole, unlike David Copperfield or The End of the Road, is simply not
fictionally narrated.
V. THE NEGATIVE STAGE

At this point Levinson might fairly point out that I can claim all I want, but a claim is not
a response. The second stage of his argument was precisely meant to show that though at
first glance it might seem that actual authors narrate their novels, this is incoherent,
because they cannot make the assertions about the fictional world that are clearly being
made. Someone at the beginning of The Heart of the Matter claims that “Wilson sat on
the balcony of the Bedford Hotel with his bald pink knees thrust against the ironwork.”23
Graham Greene is clearly not asserting this; he of all people should know that neither
Wilson nor the Bedford Hotel exists. Indeed, four pages earlier, he has told us explicitly
that “[n]o character in this book is based on that of a living person.” 24 Anyone prepared
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to make the assertion about Wilson and the Bedford must be at the fictional level, and
Graham Greene is simply not. The simplest hypothesis we can make is that there is a
fictional narrator who offers us these facts about the fictional world.
There are two ways of responding to this second stage of the argument. First, one
can emphasize the continuity of Greene-style fictions with other fictional narratives
where we do not infer a fictional narrator. Traditionally, the oral storyteller is given as an
example. To bring things a little closer to home, consider telling a joke. Here you begin
to tell an audience about an American, an Australian, and a New Zealander; but only the
most churlish listeners ask for more details about them, or how you know them, or why
we should trust what you say. 25 Anyone who knows about joke-telling knows that these
people do not really exist, that one should merely imagine that the events related
occurred. An improvised (third-person omniscient) bedtime story is even closer to the
case of the Greene novel. Indeed, I cannot see any relevant difference in kind between the
bedtime story transcribed and the Greene novel. We know that the novel is “just” a story;
we know we are only supposed to imagine these events’ having occurred, not to believe
they actually did, let alone that Greene believes they did.
Of course, it is not just Graham Greene who writes in this ‘transparent’ style, but
he is an ideal example. 26 Other commonly suggested candidates for exemplars of the
style are Ernest Hemingway, and nineteenth-century English novelists. I believe the latter
are much less simple and unproblematic than they are usually taken to be. There are often
surprising interjections in the first person by narrators of indeterminate ontological level,
or incoherent attempts at founding the fiction. I shy away from Hemingway as my
example because somehow his prose retains a forceful personal style despite his complete
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narratorial self-effacement. Though none of this shows that there are fictional narrators in
all nineteenth-century fiction, or Hemingway’s works, it militates against using those
works as rhetorically persuasive paradigmatic examples. Greene seems the ideal
transparent stylist.
There is a second way to criticize the second stage of the Ontological-Gap
Argument. This is to point out that it has internal tensions that ultimately undermine it.
The second stage is based on the idea that the artist cannot present the fictional world to
us, because she does not stand in the right relation to it – the two are on different
ontological levels. This problem is solved by positing an agent at the fictional level, who
thereby does stand in the right epistemic relation to the fictional world. But it is not clear
that this is a solution to the problem Levinson sets up. The problem is that we have a
bunch of things at the level of the real world – the artist and the audience, for instance –
and a bunch of things at the ontological level of the fiction – the characters and events of
the story – and there is no bridge from the latter to the former, no way for the fictional to
be presented to the real. The proposed solution is to add one more entity to the fictional
world: a narrator. But how does this help us? If we could not simply look and see the
fictional world, how is one more fictional entity supposed to change that? Another way to
see the problem is to ask: If we cannot understand how the artist can reach down and
show us the fictional world, how is it that the fictional narrator can reach up and show it
to us? In fact, if we must choose between these alternatives, surely it makes more sense to
accept the former. Clearly fictions are in some sense part of our world – we really do
interact with them – so we should be able to have some sort of access to them. But it is
not clear that the real world is part of every fictional world – certainly not in the same
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way – so it is not obvious that a fictional entity could have any intentional relation to a
real entity, as presentation, or telling, implies. Thus it makes more sense to suppose a real
agent could show the fictional to us than to suppose a fictional agent could.
A ubiquity theorist might try to respond to this apparent inconsistency in a
number of ways. She might suggest that the narrator just presents the fictional world in a
certain way, but not to us. We just happen to be in the right place at the right time and see
what it is presenting. Or perhaps the narrator presents it to other unspecified fictional
entities, and we look over their shoulders, unbeknownst to them.
But apart from specific worries about these particular suggestions – such as the
coherence of the idea of a presentation to no one, and the epicyclic multiplication of
fictional entities – they miss the main point of the objection. Unless the narrator has some
sort of ontological dual-citizenship in the real and fictional worlds, there is still an
ontological gap between us and the fictional world. Now, one might ask what the
problem with such a gap is. And, indeed, I don’t have one. 27 But this avenue is not open
to the ubiquity-theorist. If the ontological gap between the real and fictional worlds is not
a problem, this strategy can’t get off the ground. For without a problem, there is no need
to posit another entity – a fictional narrator – to explain our access to Greene-style
fictions.
Jerrold Levinson has responded to my criticisms of the Ontological-Gap
Argument. 28 He claims as common ground between us that John Barth and Charles
Dickens “wrote texts which, when imaginatively engaged with in the prescribed way,
convey stories, and that fictionally Jacob Horner and David Copperfield are telling us
their stories,” but he denies that this licenses the conclusion that “Barth and Dickens are
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telling fictional stories.” 29 But if John Barth and Charles Dickens do not tell fictional
stories, who does? On Levinson’s view, no one ever tells fictional stories (that is, no
actual person).
Levinson does restrict his view to straightforward “reported” fictional narratives,
avoiding the special problems of postmodern and other “storytelling” fictions (see §VI,
below), so there is a position in logical space where one would allow that (only) the
postmodernists and their ilk tell fictional stories. But, again, note the oddity of this
conclusion. Postmodernists are supposed to be notorious for having rejected storytelling
wherever possible. I maintain that writing a text that, when imaginatively engaged with in
the manner prescribed by our fictional practices, conveys a story, just is one way among
many of telling a story.
VI. A MINIMAL THEORY AND SOME CONSEQUENCES30

I have acknowledged that there are two ontological levels involved in our engagement
with fiction, that we are on a different one from the characters and events of the fiction,
and yet that we come to know about the fictional world. How can I claim there is no
problem here? The answer is simply that though there are two ontological levels, there is
no relevant ontological or epistemological gap. It seems to me that we learn about a
fictional world from the person who invented it – the artist – through the medium of the
artwork. Concerns about how we have access to fictional worlds seem to me closely
analogous to the problems about how we have access to possible worlds that Kripke was
at such pains to dissolve. 31 A fictional world is not like a distant planet that we need some
magical telescope to find out about. Its nature is just as stipulated as that of any possible
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world we might propose. 32 It is stipulated by the artist through the work. So to learn
about it, we engage with the work.
As Wilson points out, if there is a fictional narrator it is usually pretty obvious
from the work. 33 If the story is told in the first person, ostensibly by someone with a
different name from the author’s, and it is sold as a novel, we have many good reasons to
suppose that within this fiction being told there is also a fictional telling by a fictional
agent. Sometimes the signs are much more subtle, as in the popular example of Henry
James’s “The Liar.” But sometimes we have simply no reason to suppose there is a
fictional telling of the story we read or see. In The Heart of the Matter, Graham Greene
spins a good yarn, but there is no reason to posit an overarching fictional telling within it
or co-extensive with it.
One advantage of my theory is that it can deal with all literary fictions, although
one has to look at each case individually. Of the ubiquity theorists, only Levinson points
out that the theory may not be able to handle “storytelling narrators” in Walton’s
terminology – narrators who clearly signal the fictionality of the story they are
presenting. 34 The two examples Levinson gives are William Makepeace Thackeray’s
Vanity Fair (1847-8) and John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969). My
view is that Thackeray is indeed narrating Vanity Fair, just much less self-effacingly than
a Graham Greene, while Fowles’s narrator-as-impresario is too tricky to allow us to
identify him unproblematically with the author.35
But whether or not you agree with my individual interpretations, ultimately our
decision about whether there is a fictional narrator will be part of our intentional
explanation of any given artwork. 36 Both Vanity Fair and The End of the Road have
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inconsistent chronologies. Yet we believe only the latter has an unreliable narrator, in the
usual sinister sense. Why? Because part of any complete understanding of The End of the
Road must take account of the deliberate concealment of the inconsistent time-structure;
it cries out for explanation. But the temporal inconsistencies in Vanity Fair, while even
greater, seem merely to be errors – a function of the book’s serial production. Nothing of
interest to an understanding of Vanity Fair comes from a close investigation of the
confusion of its temporal structure. 37 Similarly, whether we posit a fictional narrator in
The Heart of the Matter or “The Liar” is a question of what it would buy us in terms of
understanding these works. If I understand these works correctly, the supposition of a
fictional narrator in The Heart of the Matter would get us no further than the intuitive
understanding that Greene himself is telling the tale. On the other hand, the supposition
of a fictional narrator in “The Liar” makes sense of its boss-eyed view of the action, and
gives rise to further interesting critical questions.
We can also use this general point to criticize some other narratological theories.
Gregory Currie, for instance, argues that we can eliminate external narrators, putting
(implied) authors in their place. Now, it is not entirely clear what he means by an
“external” narrator, but he is discussing cases of unreliability like James’s “The Liar.”
Thus an external narrator seems to be the kind of narrator the ubiquity thesis posits – an
agent at the fictional level, but not a character involved in the action. Currie claims we
can do without these posits, explaining away this sort of unreliability as ironic narration
by the implied author.
This seems a procrustean solution to me. Unreliable narrators do not usually seem
ironic. They often seem sinister or treacherous in their underhand subversion of the role
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of the omniscient narrator. Moreover, there seems to be no good reason to do away with
unreliable fictional narrators. Unless we have independent reason to suppose that all
narratives are narrated in the same way, by the same type of agent, there is no need to get
rid of all fictional narrators. Let us introduce them where we need them, but only where
we need them.
At this point, a ubiquity theorist might criticize my minimal theory by pointing to
a possible parallel between hypothetical intentionalism and the ubiquity thesis.
Hypothetical intentionalists argue that we should keep the hypothetical and actual authors
separate in our theory even when the author’s actual intentions agree with an ideal
hypothesis about them. Similarly, mightn’t one argue that we should always give both the
actual and the fictional narrator a place in our theory, even though in some cases (for
example Greene-style fictions and most films) there seems to be no difference between
the authorial and fictional narration? 38
We should not. Hypothetical intentionalism is a theory about how we properly go
about interpreting works of art. If it is the right theory, we can appeal to it in disputing the
meanings of individual works, but whether it is the right theory is a meta-question. The
question of whether there is an overarching narrator at the fictional level is rather a
question of the content of a work of art – that is, it is an interpretive question. I see no
prima facie reason why we should suppose there is a general answer to it for all
narratives, any more than we should suppose all narratives have a particular timestructure. Of course, there may be secunda facie reasons, so to speak, but I have shown
that those thus far suggested are unsound.
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I have argued, then, that the best account of our engagement with literary
narratives does not entail our always positing a fictional narrator – an agency at the
fictional level that is credited with presenting the fictional world to us. Of course, since
these are stories, there must be someone telling them, but unless there is some particular
reason for thinking otherwise, I see no problem with the intuitive view that the person
telling the story is the one who made it up – the author.
I will end by mentioning two areas about which my minimal theory invites further
thought. One is the extension of my theory to other forms of narrative art, particularly
film. Due to the collaborative nature of film production, it is contentious whether there is
a single actual ‘author’ who could be thought to ‘tell the story’ of the film. But it might
be that the most important component of my theory is that an entity at the actual rather
than the fictional level is responsible for the telling of some tales. This might be
consistent with a view that implied, rather than actual authors are the narrators of certain
works. Another area my minimal theory may have implications for is theory of
interpretation. Some theorists argue that any consideration of the actual artist in engaging
with a work is inappropriate. But such consideration may be unavoidable if artists are
sometimes the narrators of their works. 39
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